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INTRODUCTION

The accounting profession must bear a good deal of responsibility
for the current wave of corporate scandals, as must those CEOs whose
watchword was greed, lackadaisical directors, projections-for-hire
investment analysts, banks selling methods designed to deceive, and
institutional investors asleep at the switch. One set of villains,
however, have managed thus far to float beneath the radar screen and
thus escape the lion-sized portion of blame that should rightly be laid
at their door: lawyers.
The hidden dirty secret of corporate scandals is that without
lawyers, few corporate scandals would exist and fewer still would
succeed long enough to cause any significant damage. No reform
directed at other groups or institutions that is enacted by Congress, the
SEC, or any other body, private or public, will accomplish its
intended result as long as lawyers are allowed to roam in a law-free
zone where legal fees know no bounds and the bankruptcy of one
firm's corporate client only provides more legal fees to another firm.
Some racket: The client disintegrates with its lawyers' assistance and
the lawyers need to pay back (at most) a token amount of the huge
fees they reaped assisting the fraud that brought the client down. Even
better: The lawyers get hired by a client, that some other law firm has
helped bring down, to fight the SEC, the Justice Department, or
* Professor of Law, Boston University. A sketch of some of the ideas discussed here and
portions of the language used here were originally presented in Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave
Lawyers a Pass?, FORBES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 58. 1appreciate the cooperation of Forbes on this
project.
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creditors in bankruptcy. Perhaps they are hired by institutions
victimized by another firm's client, as counsel, for example, to a
creditors committee in a bankruptcy proceeding. Even more shocking:
Lawyers can do all this with virtually no risk. There is no real
prospect of criminal prosecution, SEC enforcement actions or
discipline, or state bar sanctions. And best of all: This almost-togood-to-be-true world that lawyers inhabit is all but impervious to
change. As for everybody else? Well, they just have to live with the
consequences, however painful those may be.
I.

LAWYERS, LIES AND MARKET-GATE

To take my assertions one at a time: Am I right that lawyers are
responsible for much of the present travail? Take Enron. Vinson &
Elkins, a prestigious Texas-based law firm, and other law firms
representing Enron blessed many of the related-party transactions that
played such a large role in Enron's demise. I am certain that many of
these transactions were fraudulent-meaning they violated civil and
criminal law.
Kirkland & Ellis, a prestigious Chicago-based firm, represented
numerous Enron-related partnerships-entities with names like
Raptor and
,2 Condor, names that all but screamed out, "Fraud is going
on here." They too blessed related-party transactions that I believe to
1. For an extensive discussion of Vinson & Elkins's role in the collapse of Enron, see Ellen
Joan Pollock, Lawyers for Enron FaultedIts Deals, Didn't Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May 22,
2002, at AI; Michael France What About the Lawyers?, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 23, 2002, at 58.
Vinson & Elkins, as well as Kirkland & Ellis, see infra note 3 and accompanying text, were
sued, inter alia, for securities fraud by Enron investors. On Dec. 20, 2002, the court denied
Vinson & Elkins' motion to dismiss, but did dismiss the complaint against Kirkland & Ellis. In
re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.Tex. 549
2002). For a discussion of the involvement of these two firms' in Enron's shady transactions, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, see id. at *656-674, 704-706.
2. See Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Securities Laws at in 857-96, In re
Enron Corporate Sec. Litig., (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 8, 2002) (No. H-01-3624) (University of
California Regents' class action complaint detailing Kirkland & Ellis's alleged role in
Enron's violations of securities law). See id. at *305-317, 413-415. In dismissing the
complaint against Kirkland & Ellis, the court said:
While the allegations against Kirkland & Ellis may indicate that it acted with
significant conflicts of interest and breached professional ethical standards, unlike its
claim against Vinson & Elkins, Lead Plaintiff has not alleged that Kirkland & Ellis
exceeded activities [that] would be protected by an attorney client relationship ...
because [the firm] never made any material misrepresentations or omissions to
investors or the public generally that might make it liable [for securities fraud as a
primary violator]. Any documents it drafted were for private transactions between
Enron and the SPEs and the partnerships and were not included in or drafted for [the
public or shareholders of Enron]. Any opinion letters that the firm wrote are not
alleged to have reached the plaintiffs nor been drafted for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
It was not Enron's counsel for either its securities filings or its SEC filings.
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be fraudulent. Kirkland & Ellis was surely not the only law firm to
sign off on behalf of the entities and their big-time investors. Merrill
Lynch, for example, marketed those partnerships to big-time investors
based on documents that intimated the partnerships were great
investments because partners would be privy to inside information
3
concerning Enron. Some set of lawyers and one or more firms had to
have approved those marketing documents. To wit, representatives of
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan, banks that also appear to have assisted
Enron in its hell-bent quest to cook its books, testified before
Congress that the shady and, again in my opinion, illegal transactions
between the banks and Enron were approved by Citigroup's, J.P.
4
Morgan's, and Enron's lawyers. Further, the First Interim Report of
Neal Batson (the court-appointed examiner for the Enron bankruptcy
proceedings) makes clear that the accountants sought out and relied
on the guidance of lawyers when trying to determine if certain
transactions should be booked as sales or something else.5 In fact,
Enron had to provide Andersen with two legal opinions from its
outside counsel in order for Andersen's accountants to sign off on the
accounting treatment of the transactions.6 This clearly suggests that
these were not situations where, as many have claimed, lawyers were
merely following the advice of the accountants, but rather it was the
lawyers who made the accountants feel comfortable about the way
some of the Enron transactions were to be booked.
Before we go any further, a few definitions are in order. Fraud is, in
plain English, lying to someone to get them to give you their stuff.
In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 706. As the court explained at great length at the start of its
opinion, there is no private cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud. The
involvement of the firm thus had to be substantial enough to make it liable as a primary
violator. On the facts available to the plaintiffs and alleged by them, the court found that
Kirkland & Ellis could not be sued as a primary violator of the law. Those facts as

described by the court would, in my opinion, have been more than sufficient to sustain a
claim for aiding and abetting fraud were it not for the fact that Congress tacitly affirmed
the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank of Denver v. FirstInterstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994), when it enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A), thus eliminating private causes of action for mere
aiding of securities fraud.
3. See generally The Role of the FinancialInstitutions in Enron's Collapse: HearingsBefore
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th
Cong. (2002), 2002 WL 1722723 (F.D.C.H.) and 2002 WL 1767468 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter
Financial Institutions Hearings] (detailing the role of Merrill Lynch and other investment
banks' in Enron's transactions).
4. See id.
5. See First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner at 38 n.98, In re
Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2001) (No. 01-16034).
6. Id.
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Sometimes the lie is expressed out loud. Other times it is told by
speaking and leaving out important information that the person with
the "stuff' would certainly have wanted to consider before parting
with that stuff. Consider the statement, "I have $40,000 in the bank,"
when spoken to a prospective lender. If you have written a check to
another for $40,000 post-dated for the next day, you have lied by
omitting important information.
Not all untruths are lies. A lie is an untruth spoken when one knows
it is an untruth or when one asserts something as true when one has no
idea whether the statement is true or not. Consider the statement, "I
did not eat a salad last Wednesday." I have no idea what I ate last
Wednesday. So, the assertion is a lie, at least if it turns out later that I
did eat a salad and maybe whether or not I ate a salad. Finally, an
often over-looked point, one need not know-what is true to know what
is false. Consider the statement, "I ate chicken last Wednesday." I
know that is false because I never eat chicken. It is irrelevant that I
have not a clue what I did eat last Wednesday.
I said I was certain that many of Enron's related party transactions
were fraudulent. Why? The partnerships were buying assets from
Enron and making trades with Enron that Enron was financing. This
made it seem as if Enron was generating profits that it was not (a lie).
This also made it seem as if Enron had protected itself from potential
losses from risky assets and trades (another lie)-risks it was not
transferring to the related-entities , given because Enron was
promising the investors in those entities a profit, no matter what
happened. These lies were told to get people to buy Enron's stock at
inflated values-values driven by financial statements that included
these lies, thus projecting an intentionally false picture of Enron's
financial condition. They were, in other words, lies to get people to
give up their stuff.
Moreover, some, if not all of the so-called "related entities," did not
qualify to buy anything from Enron because they did not meet the
requirements that would have made it legitimate to book these
transactions as sales between Enron and an arms-length trading
partner, which is how Enron booked them. Some of the related party
transactions seemed to have failed the base requirement that at least
three percent of the investment made by the "special purpose entity"
("SPE") be from sources other than Enron. Furthermore, most, if not
all, of the SPEs that arguably met the three-percent minimum were
nonetheless obviously not engaging in "arms length trades" with
Enron-the trades that a truly independent party would entertain. The
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SPEs were controlled by Enron's CFO, who "supervised" the agents
who were supposed to be negotiating on Enron's behalf with the
SPEs, entities in which their boss had a huge financial stake. In short,
it was Enron CFO Andrew Fastow's will (used in service of his
interests) that was manifest on both sides of the "negotiation." All in
all, these transactions were more like an eyelash-length, than an armslength, negotiation. Thus, not only were those buying Enron's stock
"defrauded" by Enron, Fastow's partnerships, and knowledgeable
principals of both, some of the investors in the related-entities were
defrauded too (i.e., told a lie that the entities were qualified to trade
7
with Enron, when many, if not all, were not).
Marketing the partnerships as investments, Merrill Lynch
emphasized to would-be investors in these partnerships that the major
investor and controlling partner was Enron's CFO, a person uniquely
situated to make would-be investors in these partnerships (set up to
trade with Enron) sure, steady, and substantial profits. This was a
selling point because as Enron's CFO, Fastow had a front-row seat at
Enron's planning sessions and understood the company's strategy and
financial state as only a person with access to all of Enron's inside
information would. Trading on inside information is both a civil and
criminal wrong. Again, the lawyers approving Merrill Lynch's
marketing strategy seemed not to notice or care about this none-toosubtle suggestion that inside information would be the key to the
partnerships' future success.
J.P. Morgan, Citigroup and other major banks engaged in what they
call "structured financing" with Enron. It worked like this: The banks
would enter into contracts to buy a commodity from entity A at X
price some time in the future, say within the next year or two. Entity
A (and each bank had its own A) would contract to buy that
commodity from Enron for X price (or X plus some take for entity A)
within the same period of time. Enron, in turn, would agree to buy the
commodity from the banks for X + Y price within that period of time.
Y was some percentage of X that turns out to be what one might

7. Of course, any of the investors who knew that their investment was not at risk because
Enron had guaranteed debt were not defraudees, but, in my opinion, defrauders.
8. See FinancialInstitutionsHearing,supra note 3, at 1-3 (testimony of Robert Roach, Chief
Investigator,
Permanent
Subcomm.
on
Investigations)
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/O72302roach.pdf. See also id. app. at A-l-A-8 (testimony
of
Robert
Roach,
laying
out
Enron's
prepay
scheme)
available at
http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/072302roach-a.pdf. Citigroup and J.P. Morgan were not
the only banks engaged in "trading" with Enron aimed at helping Enron hide its debt. See
Richard Oppel Jr., Senate Hearing Set on Enron's Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at C6.
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expect the interest rate to be, if Enron were borrowing X from the
banks.
Notice the circle. The commodity in Enron's possession at the start
is (at least on paper) to be transferred to A, which in turn will
"deliver" the commodity to its sponsoring bank. Then the bank will
"deliver" the commodity back to Enron. In the end, the commodity
ends up where it started, with Enron. Indeed, the commodity never
has to leave Enron's possession except on paper. In the meantime, the
money, which is the bank's money at the beginning, moved from the
bank to A (ostensibly as a "prepayment" for the commodity) and from
A to Enron (again ostensibly as a "prepayment" for Enron's promise
to deliver the commodity when A demanded it). Then the money plus
the add-on that looks like interest for the use of the bank's money was
to be paid back to the bank by Enron, supposedly for the commodity
that Enron already had and which it was promising to re-purchase for
itself at a greater cost in the future. So, the money ended where it
started-with the bank, except that it returned with the interest-like
add-on.
Enron booked the money coming in (from the banks via A) as
trading "revenue" and booked its promise to "prepay" the banks
(later, and for a commodity it already owned) as a trading liability. As
a "trading liability" Enron's promise to repay, excuse me I mean
"prepay," the banks could be offset not just by the "revenue" it had
just booked, but also by other so-called "trades."
The problem is that none of this qualifies as a "trade." As Enron's
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, told Enron (this time correctly),
these types of "trades" must be booked as loans from the banks,
unless four conditions are met. As should be plain, however, Enron
had no intention of booking these transactions as loans, four
conditions or not. The point was to get "financing" from the banks
that did not show up on the books as loans. If these "trades" had been
booked as loans, it would have been clear to investors that Enron was
much more heavily in debt than Enron wanted its investors to know.
So here again Enron was lying to get people's stuff, and the banks
were necessary for these lies and may well have lied themselves in
doing these deals.
Among the four conditions that these "trades" could not meet were
that each A had to be "independent" from its respective bank.
Citigroup's and J.P. Morgan's entities were, however, created by their
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respective pbanks, funded by them, and, as a practical
matter, under
the
9
.
complete control of their sponsoring banks. Another condition that
these "trades" failed to meet was that each of the three "trading"
partners (the banks, the A entities, and Enron) had to have a
legitimate business purpose for entering into the deal. The banks'
witnesses who appeared before a Senate subcommittee could identify
no such purpose. Apparently, the purpose was to allow Enron to
book financing as liabilities related to ongoing business instead of as
loans. Unless cooking one's books counts as a legitimate business
purpose, the transactions failed on this criterion as well. The third
condition that these transactions failed to meet was that the "buying"
by the banks and their A entities had to be unrelated to the "selling"
by the banks to Enron. In short, the transactions could not be linked.
As the bank witnesses admitted to the Senate subcommittee, the
transactions between themselves, their "As," Enron, and the banks
again, were connected. No party to these transactions had any interest
in fulfilling its leg, apart from the other two parties fulfilling their
legs. Okay, no need to beat a dead horse. We will stop here.
For the reasons just given, these transactions were loans, not trades.
And the banks' cooperation (setting up As, calling their extension of
money "prepayments" instead of loans etc.) was necessary for
Enron's lies to succeed in duping anyone. The banks needed to back
up Enron's lies with lies of their own, which they seemed all too
willing to do and seem still to be doing by insisting that they were
"prepaying" Enron instead of lending it money. Fraud does not
require that the lie-teller keep or ever get the defrauded party's stuff.
Lying to get people to give their stuff to one's cousin or to a business
contact whom one knows will be grateful for the help (here in terms
of future deals) suffices.
What was the role of lawyers in all of this? Take the banks'
lawyers first: A law firm set up, ran, and served as a trustee for J.P.

9. The

documents

produced

by the

Senate's

Governmental

Affairs

Committee's

Subcommittee on Investigations, showing the complete control that Citibank and J.P. Morgan

exercised over their respective banks, was devastating to the stories being told (under oath) by
bank witnesses, i.e., that each bank's A was "independent" and that decision making for each A
was handled by that A's Board of Directors. See generally Financial Institutions Hearings,
supra note 3. I encourage anyone interested in the culpability and credibility of these two major
financial institutions to get a video tape of this hearing from C-SPAN, if available, because a
written transcript cannot possibly convey the melting of the bank's witnesses as the hearing
progresses. If a video is not available, the written transcript will give you all the information you
need, although minus the amazing "color" of the spectacle. I play the video for friends; it is just
that amazing.
10. See generally FinancialInstitutions Hearings,supra note 3.
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Morgan's entity A, Mahonia. 1I Mahonia had no assets of its own. It
needed none, since it just passed through to Enron the "payments"
from J.P. Morgan (ostensibly for assets Mahonia was supposed to
"buy" from Enron and "deliver" to J.P. Morgan). Mahonia's sole
raison d'etre was to act as a pass-through to mask the fact that J.P.
Morgan was loaning Enron money that Enron was to pay back with
interest. To make all that worse, the offshore based trustee-lawyer
for Mahonia also served on Mahonia's Board of Directors (its
supposed decision-making body), served as Mahonia's counsel, and
identified himself as J.P. Morgan's lawyer when he set up Mahonia.
Thus, this lawyer-agent of J.P Morgan in a position to make decisions
for Mahonia was nonetheless comfortable participating in the charade
that Mahonia was independent.
Second, J.P. Morgan personnel testified under oath before a Senate
committee that lawyers (not the Mahonia lawyer referred to above but
presumably either or both J.P. Morgan's in-house legal team or
lawyers from one or more major New York firms) assured them that
Mahonia was legally "independent" from its puppet-master, J.P.
Morgan. In fact, Mahonia was not independent, as explained above.
The lawyers were thus assuring J.P. Morgan of something that was
not true. If they had no idea whether it was true or not, the lawyers
had no business assuring anyone of anything.13 Similarly, Citigroup
personnel testified under oath before the same Senate committee that
they had two legal opinions, one from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy, Citigroup's lawyers, and the other from Vinson & Elkins,
Enron's lawyers, assuring Citigroup, in one way or the other, that its
round-and-round deals with Enron were legitimate. 14 If Enron's
lawyers, Vinson & Elkins, were telling Citigroup that the deal
qualified as a trade, not a loan, one can be sure they were telling
Enron officials the same thing.
Over at Merrill Lynch, lawyers seemed to have been fulfilling a
similar role. Merrill Lynch agreed to "buy" some barges from
Enron.15 Enron promised Merrill Lynch that within six months of
1I. See id. app. at C-5 (testimony of Robert Roach, laying out J.P. Morgan's involvement
with Enron) available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov.affairs/ 072302roach.c.pdf.
12. See id. app. at C- I-C-4.
13. See generally id., 2002 WL 1722723 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Jeffrey W. Dellapina,
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank). Mr. Dellapina testified that he could not
remember which lawyers told him that Mahonia was "legally" independent.
14. See generally id., 2002 WL 1722723 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Richard Caplan, Managing
Director & Co-Head, Credit Derivatives Group, Salomon Smith Bamey/Citigroup).
15. See generally id. (discussing these transactions extensively).
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Merrill's purchase Enron would find some entity to "buy" the barges
back from Merrill. Further, Enron assured Merrill that it would
receive a handsome fifteen percent "profit" from the to-be-arranged
(by Enron) "purchase." Merrill set up a SPE named E-Barge to hold
the barges. E-Barge was, at least on paper, to send Merrill funds
flowing from the commercial use of these barges. That never
happened, and Merrill never bothered about it (because, it seems
obvious to me, the entire "purchase" was a sham). E-Barge,
supposedly an SPE of Merrill's, had its expenses paid by Enron, the
previous "owner" of the barges that were now supposedly assets of
Merrill's (through E-Barge). Having failed to find any truly
independent buyer interested in purchasing these loser-barges from
Merrill, Enron apparently fulfilled its promise to Merrill by arranging
for one of Fastow's partnerships to buy the barges back from Merrill
at a "price" that included the "profit" that Merrill had been promised
ab initio. In what alternate universe would anyone call this Enron
device for parking a loser-asset off its balance sheet, a "sale?"
Enron's counsel and Merrill's counsel apparently endorsed the
reporting of this device as a "sale."' 6 I find it impossible to imagine
Enron and Merrill engaging in this bogus "sale" without lawyers
telling them they could get away with it. Lawyers were, however,
there to oblige. Did any lawyer not understand that all this funny
business had to have had as its purpose lying to investors to get them
to give up their stuff (by buying or holding Enron shares)?
Internal Merrill Lynch documents show that its personnel
considered the barge deal to be a courtesy loan to Enron-a loan that
Enron could book as revenue from the sale of an asset, the barges. In
other words, they understood it was a fraud even if they did not know
that is what the law calls this type of machination. Merrill personnel
worried that the parking of the barges at Merrill might cause others to
accuse Merrill of "aiding and abetting" Enron's manipulation of its
financial statements. Yet, Merrill's lawyers were apparently not
similarly worried. They should have been. These barge deals figure
prominently in the Justice Department's papers charging Enron's
CFO, Fastow, with criminal conduct, and, although Merrill Lynch is

16. In the July 30, 2002 Permanent Investigations Subcommittee hearing for the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Kelly Martin, Senior Vice President and President of
International Clients for Merrill Lynch, testified that "the transactions were subject to Merrill
Lynch's internal approval process, and included review with business, legal, and other personnel
who had no stake in the outcome." See id. at 1 (statement of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.)
availableat http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/073002merrillLynch.htm.
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not mentioned by name, its participation is described as that of an
unindicted co-conspirator.17 Why were Merrill's lawyers not telling
its other agents that they could not engage in conduct that might
expose Merrill to criminal charges?
The plot thickens. Merrill knew a good deal about LJM2, the entity
that took the barges off Merrill's books and handed Merrill a
handsome "profit" that looks precisely like interest on a short-term
loan. Merrill had (on behalf of Fastow) marketed investments in
LJM2 to institutional investors and others. Merrill told investors that
LJM2 was an entity set up to make deals with Enron. This is true.
Merrill also told prospective investors that LJM2 was a good
investment because Fastow, Enron's CFO, would be at LJM2's
helm-also true. The problem is, as I suggested earlier, that the
reason Fastow's captaincy made LJM2 a good bet was that Fastow
had an intimate familiarity with Enron's strategies. Most important,
Fastow had access to other Enron "proprietary information," as he put
it, while convincing Merrill Lynch to handle getting investors for
LJM2. How could LJM2 fail? It not only had Fastow with his unique
knowledge and important Enron position, it also had two other Enron
managers (both supervised by Fastow at Enron) to give it and its
investors a unique leg-up.
In sum, Fastow convinced Merrill Lynch to handle LJM2's quest
for investors by none-too-subtly alluding to his ability to use Enron
information (its property) to make money for others, the LJM2
investors. Merrill, in turn, sold LJM2 to prospective investors with the
same pitch. It is fraud for an agent to appropriate the property of his
principal for his own gain or for the gain of others absent the
principal's consent to such use. The Enron Board of Directors had
waived Enron' s conflict of interest provisions to allow Fastow to form
partnerships like LJM2, but it did not (at least not so far as the
evidence amassed thus far shows) give Fastow permission to

17. See Complaint at 9, SEC v. Fastow, (S.D. Tex. filed Oct.2, 2002) (No. H-02-3666).
18. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987). Let me explain why
this is fraud in terms of the plain English definition of fraud I gave earlier, supra p. 2. The lie is
this: "I, your agent, will use your information and all of your property only in the service of your
interests, unless you give me permission to use it for personal gain or for the gain of others." An
agent need never speak those words; they are implicit in the role of agent by virtue of the law of
agency. When an agent uses the principal's information or property for personal gain or the gain
of others without the principal's permission, the statement every agent is deemed by law to have
spoken is rendered a lie. The principal entrusts his stuff to the agent believing that the implicit
statement is true. When the agent acts in a manner as to render the statement a lie, he has gotten
the principal to give up his stuff (information or other property) by lying, which is fraud.
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appropriate Enron information for the benefit of himself or others.' 9
No private placement memorandum is issued without being vetted by
lawyers. That means some lawyer approved Merrill's sales pitch, at
least the one in the memorandum, that alluded to Fastow's too-goodto-be-legal ability to benefit LJM2 investors via his position at Enron.
Merrill's lawyers apparently did not inform Merrill that this method
of marketing might get Merrill charged with a crime or sued for
mega-damages. Merrill's lawyers were not the only ones failing here.
Probably most, if not all, of the institutions that invested in LJM2 and
other similarly-pitched Fastow business ventures checked with their
lawyers on the legality of this very incestuous relationship between
the partnerships, Fastow, and Enron. Apparently none of the lawyers
for those who ended up investing in the partnerships were concerned
about this pitch or the way LJM2 was to make its money; none of
them managed to convince her client to forego investing and blow the
whistle on Fastow, LJM2, Enron, or Merrill Lynch. Instead, it seems
clear to me that some lawyers for potential investors were telling
clients with questions that they could go ahead and get on LJM2's
gravy train.
Finally, Citigroup witnesses testified that Citigroup transferred the
risk that Enron might not complete the last leg of its circular deals,
i.e., would default on its loan obligation. Citigroup's investment bank
side, Salomon Smith Barney, marketed and sold securities, which
were put together by Citigroup, but which investors were told was
backed exclusively by Enron's credit. Notice that this convoluted
setup boils down to an Enron bond, but not one that Enron has to
acknowledge issuing on its books because it is issued by another
entity-ever-helpful Citigroup.
Citigroup knew that Enron's books were not models of honest
bookkeeping and as far from transparent as financial statements can
get. Citigroup knew that Enron was busy getting "financing" through
"trades" that did not show up as debt on Enron's books. It had to
know this. After all, it was busy helping Enron turn loans into
"trades."
Indeed, when the Salomon team sought approval to sell the Enron-

19. Note that I do not mean to suggest that Enron's board could legally have granted Fastow
permission to use Enron property for the gain of himself and his UM2 partners. After all, Board
members are not principals, nor is the Board itself. The principal is the corporation Enron,
which can only act through agents. Yet that does not mean that anything and everything
authorized by the highest ranking Enron agent serves to immunize all acts of agents further
down the chain.
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backed securities that were designed to transfer Citigroup's risk to
others, from the high-level Citigroup committee that deals with such
matters, the committee withheld its approval pending a report from
the team designed to reassure the committee that even if one counted
as debt all the debt Enron was hiding as "trades," Enron was still an
investment grade company. The Salomon team facing a short deadline
for the report did a quick and dirty calculation, resulting, according to
testimony before a Senate subcommittee, in overstating just how
much "debt" Enron was carrying that was not clearly labeled debt on
its balance sheets. Even with this overstatement, Enron still passed the
investment grade test, so the Citigroup committee approved the sale
of the Enron-backed securities.
The material given prospective investors did, as I have said, clearly
disclose that it was Enron's credit, not Citigroup's, which was
backing these securities. The problem is that the Citigroup sales
documents simply referred potential investors to Enron's books for
information on Enron's creditworthiness-books that Citigroup's own
committee refused to rely upon. The fact that Citigroup's committee
wanted the real scoop on Enron's debt load before making a
decision-wanting information either absent from Enron's financial
statements or so deeply buried in footnotes to those documents that
Citigroup's committee needed a report to get even a roughly accurate
sense of how much debt Enron was carrying-means, in my opinion,
that Citigroup was withholding material information from those it was
asking to give up their stuff by simply referring investors to Enron's
shrouded financial statements.
Citigroup defended its decision to say nothing to investors about
the debt that was hidden or absent from Enron's financial statements
by suggesting that its lawyers had vetted the information provided to
investors in these Enron-backed securities. This is simply another
instance of lawyers telling a client just what it wants to hear.
Citigroup also said that to give out the overstated debt estimate
Salomon had prepared-or any more refined estimate of Enron's real
debt load-would have been legally problematic. This is true enough.
Salomon could have been liable, at least to Enron, for asserting as fact
debt-load numbers in which it had little or no confidence. The
problem is that it is also legally problematic to invite institutions or
individuals to rely on financial statements in which Citigroup had no
confidence, as demonstrated by the actions of Citigroup's own
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committee.
Did none of Citigroup's high-priced counsel get that
2°
point?
And we must not forget the accountants. They had lawyers too.
Some set of lawyers wrote Arthur Andersen's document "retention"
policy. One need only read it to know that it is the product of a
lawyer's hand. That policy called for the destruction of documents
even when destruction could be obstruction of justice, a felony.
Knowing that the SEC had begun an informal investigation of
Enron's books, an in-house lawyer at Arthur Andersen, Nancy
Temple, instructed David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of
the Enron account, to pay attention to Andersen's "retention" policy.21
Duncan did just that. His reading of the policy apparently mirrored
my own: The policy condoned destruction of many Enron documents
even though an informal investigation of Enron was underway.
Unfortunately for poor Duncan, who later pled guilty to the felony of
obstruction of justice, the law prohibits such destruction and prohibits
him from encouraging his staff to destroy documents in order to keep
them from the SEC.
Duncan ordered the shredding to begin shortly after Temple
reminded him to consult Andersen's "retention" policy. A little over a
month later, after literally tons of documents had been destroyed,
Temple told Duncan and everyone else at Andersen to stop shredding:
She wrote clear instructions to preserve all Enron documents. 22 Why?
She did this because Andersen had received a subpoena from the
SEC. Destroying documents after the receipt of a subpoena is a

20. As to J.P. Morgan, it tried to transfer the risk that Enron would default on its "trading"
obligations by buying insurance. However, collecting on that insurance has proved a minefield.
The bank sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, and the insurance companies
defended on the ground that J.P. Morgan either procured insurance for something the law does
not permit to be insured (the payments I am calling "debt") and/or lied to the insurance
companies to get the insurance, i.e., committed fraud. See Kurt Eichenwald, Chase Counters
Accusers In Disguised-Loan Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at C2. The suit settled with J.P.
Morgan getting about 50 cents on the dollar. Peter Bahr J.P. Morgan, Insurers settle Enron
Dispute: Bank to be Paid About Half Its Loan Guarantees for Failed Energy Trades, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at El. Again, I presume that lawyers for J.P. Morgan told it that applying for
insurance for Enron's future obligation to "buy" goods from J.P. Morgan as part of a circular
transaction was just fine.
21. See Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. 45 (2002) (E-mail from Nancy Temple to Michael C. Odom Partner, Arthur
Andersen forwarded to David Duncan ).See also Arthur Andersen, Practice Administration:
Client Engagement Information-Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760,
(2000) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy).
22. For the policy, see Arthur Andersen, Practice Administration: Client Engagement
Information-Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760 supra note 21.
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felony, but so is destroying documents before a subpoena is received
but during an "informal" SEC investigation, at least, if that
destruction is done to keep the material from the SEC. I believe the
evidence collected against Andersen clearly demonstrates that
Duncan's destruction of documents and Temple's reference to the
company's policy were actions undertaken
with the intent to keep
23
investigators.
SEC
the
from
information
Temple knew how to write a memo saying, "Preserve all Enron
documents." She wrote just such a memo after the subpoena was
received. A month earlier, however, when the law called for her to
write that memo, she decided instead to write a memo that she had
to
lots of it.24
know would produce the opposite effect: shredding and
When an Enron manager named Sherron Watkins wrote a memo to
Enron's CEO, Kenneth Lay, stating that she thought Enron would
collapse in a wave of accounting scandals and providing significant
25
details on Enron activities that were, to put it mildly, over the line,
23. A jury convicted Andersen of obstruction of justice, although it seems the jurors were not
unanimous on the reasons for their verdict. Apparently not all jurors agreed that Duncan, who
pled guilty to obstructing justice, or Temple, who asserted her Fifth Amendment rights at
Andersen's trial, urged others to destroy documents to keep them from the SEC. I have no doubt
that both did precisely that. However, the one theory all jurors endorsed was that Temple had
encouraged another to alter potential evidence with the aim of keeping that evidence from the
government by telling others to eliminate from a document the conclusion that an Enron
announcement was misleading and to take her name off the memo to minimize the risk that she
would be called as a witness. According to Temple, she wanted her name and references to
Andersen's legal office omitted because it would invite some party in some later suit to call her
or other Andersen lawyers as witnesses, which she said might adversely affect Andersen's
attorney-client privilege. Andersen either had a valid attorney-client privilege to assert as to
each Temple communication with other Andersen agents or it did not, i.e., because of the crimefraud exception to the privilege. If it had a valid privilege claim, which it chose to assert, calling
Temple would not change that. See Jeff Leeds, The Andersen Verdict: Andersen Found Guilty of
Obstruction, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2002, Al. However puzzling I and others might find the
jury's lack of unanimity on the illegality of Temple and Duncan encouraging others to shred
tons of Andersen documents, the jury got this much right: A lawyer was at the heart of
Andersen's obstruction. It just failed to appreciate just how many ways she had helped her client
violate the law.
Professor Gillers wrote an op-ed for the New York Times, asserting that most, if not all,
lawyer activities cannot serve as the actus reus for obstruction of justice. See Stephen Gillers,
The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A23. In my opinion, his
reading of the statute is untenable.
24. Andersen had outside counsel on the scene when Temple wrote her invitation to shred,
another prestigious firm: Davis, Polk & Wardell. Temple consulted Davis Polk days after she
referred Duncan and others to Andersen's "retention" policy. See Destructionof Enron-Related
Documents, supra note 21 at 118-127. I do not know what the outside firm told her, but
whatever it was, it was insufficient to get her or Andersen to withdraw her initial instructions
and issue the "preserve everything" memo that would have kept Andersen on the right side of
the law. Later, Davis Polk played a key role in investigating the shredding at Andersen. Was the
firm supposed to criticize its own lackadaisical approach to all of this?
25. See Text of Letter [by Sherron Watkins] to Enron 's ChairmanAfter Departureof Chief
Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at C6.
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Vinson & Elkins, the law firm that had approved some of Enron's
shady transactions, was assigned to conduct a so-called "preliminary
investigation" into Watkins's allegations. They were given this
assignment by another lawyer, Enron's in-house general counsel,
James Derrick, who had been a partner at Vinson before joining
26
Enron' s management.
Vinson should not have accepted this assignment. To say that the
matters raised by Watkins were serious problems that warranted a
full-fledged, all-out, independent investigation of potential
wrongdoing related to Enron's financial shenanigans would have
required it to criticize its own previous advice to the company and to
open itself up to lawsuits and further scrutiny. The idea is ridiculous
that an investigation conducted by Vinson, under these circumstances,
would count to establish that Enron's management had fulfilled its
fiduciary duty to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by the
company and its agents made by a credible employee. Derrick should
not have asked Vinson to take on this assignment and Vinson should
never have accepted it. Having taken it on, Vinson should not have
done such a slip-shod, once-over-lightly "investigation" of Watkins's
allegations. It should not have accepted .,ndersen's word that all its
advice to Enron had been correct. It should have looked into any new
information gleaned in the minimal investigation it conducted that
suggested that Enron's agents were engaged in other wrongful
conduct or, at a minimum, it should h~ve advised Enron that it needed
to follow-up with dispatch and different counsel on any such new
27
information. Vinson did stumble across such new information. For
example, it happened across information suggesting that Enron was
demanding that its banks assist it in questionable deals designed to
hide debt or they would risk losing future Enron business. Vinson did
not follow up on this information or advise Enron that it do so
immediately. Vinson & Elking ultimately delivered a report to
Enron's management, telling it that no further investigation into
Watkins's allegations was necessary, so much for prelmnary. 28
While all the above examples are connected to Enron, there is
unfortunately nothing new or unique about lawyers assisting with
fraud and aiding in concealing damaging corporate information.

26. See THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON
CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 173 (2002) (widely known as the "Powers Report").

27. See id. at 176-77.
28. See id. at 176.
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Those with doubts should see the court's opinion in the National
Student Marketing case, especially the portion describing the
29
activities of White & Case lawyer Marion J. Epley, I. They might
also want to look at the reborts on Singer, Hutner's assistance of
OPM's fraud in the 1980s, and the opinion denying Jones Day's
motion for summary judgment in the suits brought against it for
helping Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings and Loan commit fraud,
obstruct justice, and engage in other wrongful conduct. 31 Finally, they
should read Klein v. Boyd, detailing a Drinker Biddle & Reath
32
partner's assistance of client fraud.
For another quite recent example, see the Los Angeles Times report
on the "investigation" conducted by Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett,
another prestigious firm, for its client Global Crossing, which asked
Simpson to look into allegations of company wrongdoing made by a
senior Global Crossing manaher in a memo similar to the Sherron
Simpson Thatcher conducted a
Watkins memo at Enron.
"preliminary" investigation on behalf of Global Crossing that was so
superficial that it makes Vinson's investigation into the Watkins
memo look good. Apparently, Simpson neither interviewed Global
Crossing's outside accountants nor the author of the memo that raised
concerns 34about Global Crossing's disclosures to investors about its
finances. Nonetheless, Simpson told managers at Global Crossing
that no further investigation into these allegations or action in
35
response to them was necessary.
Let me put this as plainly as I can: The only reason company
managers ask law firms to conduct such once-over-lightly
that
end
up
regurgitating
"investigations"-investigations
management's position that everything is hunky-dory-is to buy
36
some cover for their own or their company's wrongdoing. They are
buying the right to say, "Our lawyers gave us a clean bill of health."

29. SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
30. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, & ROGER C. CRAMPTON, THE LAW
AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 304-10 (3d ed. 1999).

31. See id. at 748-59.
32. See Klein v. Boyd, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)[ 99,352 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 18, 1996). See also HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMPTON, supra note 30, at 289-98.
33. Joseph Menn, Global Crossing Case Figure Not Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002,
at CI.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Unrectified fraud is an ongoing crime and civil wrong until it is detected by the defrauded
party.
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What could any law firm asked to conduct one of these blindfolded,
hands-tied, conclusion-foregone "investigations" be thinking? Could
any experienced lawyer have any doubt that she was being paid to
allow some ongoing illegality to continue or to delay anyone,
including the company's board of directors, finding out about past
misdeeds by management?
Simpson's story, a common one, is apparently that it asked senior
management if the memo contained anything that the company's
accountants did not know (or had not approved) or anything that the
board had not approved. 37 Management said the accountants knew all
the facts contained in the "whistleblower" memo and had nonetheless
given Global Crossing the all-clear and that the board knew
38
everything as well. Simpson's story is that given that management
confirmed
those sign-offs, its barely existent investigation was
39
proper. Here is the problem: No accountant and no board of
directors is privileged to commit fraud. Assuming the management
was not lying to Simpson about who knew what, if the books were
cooked in some way, Global Crossing could have been committing
ongoing securities, mail, and wire fraud. And, assuming the board had
approved everything and that some of what it approved was illegal,
the board might not have understood that it had broken the law. That
is what the lawyers are for.
One does not need a lawyer to ask management if accountants or
the board has approved something. A cab driver could do that job just
as well and a lot cheaper. A lawyer is necessary to figure out what
additional facts a board or accountants should have been told. But the
quick and dirty "investigations" conducted by Vinson and Simpson
were simply not deep enough to discover what more, if anything, the
accountants or the board should have been told before their sign-offs
were secured. No, these lawyers are being hired for something else.
Managers want to be able to say they did something in response to a
"whistleblower memo," because "something must be done"-just not
anything of any use to anyone, and certainly nothing that gets at the
truth.
1I.

THE LAW-FREE ZONE

Three avenues for regulating lawyers exist: state authorities, federal

37. See Menn, supra note 33.
38. See id.
39. See id.

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 26

authorities, and private lawsuits against lawyers. Each of those three
can in turn be broken into two major subcategories. The states have
bar disciplinary authorities and attorneys general. The federal
government has the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Justice Department. Private lawsuits can be initiated by third parties
and by client corporations against lawyers for malpractice or aiding
other of the client in breaching their fiduciary duties. None of these
avenues now work.
State disciplinary authorities are charged with enforcing state ethics
rules, not the ABA rules, but state rules that are based on the ABA's
rules (although most state rules diverge sharply in critical areas, most
notably in the area of confidentiality, from the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct). State ethics rules are law, although in the
hierarchy of law, state ethics rules are trumped in almost every
instance by other law (state or federal) with which they conflict. I
will return to that point later. For present purposes, we may put the
hierarchy issue aside.
There are ethics rules that speak to a lawyer's obligations when a
client is intent on committing fraud or otherwise violating the law and
seeks to use the lawyer's services to accomplish that end. Every
state's ethics rules prohibit assisting client fraud or illegal conduct
and demand that a lawyer resign when she "knows" that her client
intends to use the lawyer's services to perpetuate the fraud or other
42
illegality. These rules are, however, ineffective for a number of
reasons.
First, lawyers never "know" their clients are committing fraud
because that is what the lawyers say. That is, at least, what lawyers
say. True, as Geoffrey Hazard has written, a radical epistemologist
might maintain that no one ever "knows" anything, at least not about
what another intends and whether that actually violates something as
subject to interpretation as a legal norm. But as Hazard also
40. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1992) (A deeper discussion of the avenues available for regulating lawyers, especially Part
1I-A).
41. See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1389 (1992) (A deeper discussion of the relationship between state law and the legal
profession's ethics).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 16(a) (1991). Model Rules 1.2(d) and
1.16(a) are included virtually unchanged in almost all state-adopted ethics codes and those states

with different versions of these rules have rules that include the points I have described in the
text.
43. Hazard noted:
Of course, speaking in terms of radical epistemology, it is true that a lawyer cannot
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explained, however, that lawyers are paid to operate in the real world
and to provide practical advice on the law, not to ponder such
imponderables as whether falling trees make noise when no one is
there or whether anyone can ever "know" anything about others or the
law."
Consider that lawyers can, of course, spot fraud that others are
trying to perpetrate against their clients, so long as those others are
not members of the client's senior management team, whom lawyers
treat as their clients even though they are not. This ability to discern
wrongdoing is shut down when a lawyer looks at her own client or the
senior management team she imagines as her client. This is a product
of the litigation mentality.
A litigator's mindset is to press any argument with even a patina of
legal plausibility to justify conduct that has been called into question
by an adversary. Once the adversarial system is in play, the litigator's
mindset is justifiable. Licensing lawyers to offer every possible legal
justification when there is another side whose job it is to present every
possible legal objection to the very same conduct is a route to truth, at
least that is the premise underlying our judicial system. I accept that
premise to the extent the clash of arguments about facts and law
produces "court truth," which is to be distinguished from actual truth,
but is nonetheless of value. Court truth diverges from actual truth for
good reason. Our legal system is committed not just to producing
truth, but to maintaining other values as well-values that, in my
opinion, have a good claim to being important enough to justify
sacrificing discovery of the "whole truth and nothing but the truth."
Those values include privacy, limited government, the sanctity of
marriage, the sanctity of the confessional, and even the right to get
sound legal advice. Such values should be distinguished from using a
lawyer to commit crimes or frauds (an intent that destroys the
attorney-client privilege because it is inimical to the public good).
Whatever justification the adversarial process provides for
"know" what a client-or anyone else-intends. In these terms it is impossible for a
lawyer to "know" anything. Yet the practice of law is based on practical knowledge,
that is, practical assessments leading to empirical conclusions, which form the basis
for irrevocable action. Lawyers certainly possess such practical knowledge. If a
lawyer can have practical knowledge of how the purposes of others may affect his
client, he can have the same knowledge of how his client's purposes may affect
others. It is in that sense that the lawyer can "know" when a client's purpose is illegal.
The question, therefore, is what degree of certainty imposes legal obligations on one
who "knows"?
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How FarMay a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 672 (1981).
44. See id.
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litigators, pushing the limits of law to justify client conduct that is
contemplated or ongoing is another matter altogether. When passing
on the legality of contemplated or ongoing client conduct, there is no
adversary present to challenge stretched legal interpretations, and
there is no umpire available to judge between competing visions of
what the law allows. Most talented lawyers can weave an
interpretation to justify anything, as long as no adversary is present to
challenge it and no umpire around to throw out the bizarre
interpretation. Now, we reach the crux of the matter. Who frees
corporate clients from the law that would constrain them? Their
lawyers do.
Lawyers thus can know what their clients (or more accurately in
the present context, their clients' agents) are doing and we should
insist that they take responsibility for knowing, unless we are willing
to accept a world in which law does not constrain what their business
clients do. As we proceed with the survey of the failed avenues for
lawyer regulation, however, it will become apparent that we do not
insist that lawyers know. Indeed, we do not insist that big-time
transaction lawyers conform to any set of norms. We allow them to
inhabit a law-free zone that they can then extend to their corporate
clients in the manner I have just outlined.
As I said, state disciplinary authorities are charged with enforcing
states' rules of ethics. I have described the rules that prohibit lawyers
from assisting fraud that they "know" a client is perpetrating and that
demand that lawyers resign, if the client persists in that conduct,
despite the efforts of the lawyers to dissuade the client from breaking
the law. Those are the only rules that require anything of corporate
transaction lawyers whose clients are using them to commit fraud,
crimes, or intentional torts. There are other rules that bear on this
situation, but they merely present the lawyer with options on how to
proceed. There are two such option-rules I have in mind. First, the
rule that allows lawyers for corporate clients to report management
illegality up the corporate ladder, all the way to the board of directors,
41
if necessary. Second, many states now allow lawyers to disclose to
the government or injured parties' illegal client conduct in which the
lawyers' services were used to cause serious economic harm, despite
the ABA's continuing rejection of such a provision. Rules that allow
action at a lawyer's discretion, however, do not operate as restraints.

45. See, e g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1991) (which all adopting states

have left virtually unchanged from the ABA version).
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But whey aren't the rules prohibiting "knowing' assistance
enforced? Establishing what a lawyer actually "knew" is a formidable
task, even for well-funded agencies with expertise. It is fanciful to
imagine state bar authorities, notoriously under-funded and understaffed, succeeding in establishing assistance of fraud by a big-time
corporate law firm. Moreover, even if state ethics' rules prohibited
"reckless" assistance of client fraud, even if the option-rules were
changed to insist on certain actions when a lawyer had reason to
suspect client fraud (such as advising management that an
independent investigation be conducted and reporting to the
company's board that such advice had been given), state bar
authorities would not be able to regulate the corporate bar.
State bar authorities are not just under-funded and under-staffed;
they lack the expertise in securities law and complicated financial
transactions to handle a disciplinary hearing against a lawyer for
assisting securities fraud or mail or wire fraud embedded in a
complex corporate deal. Even if they could afford to hire experts in
such cases, competent securities law experts (including professors)
would be loathe to take on lawyers from prestigious firms on behalf
of institutions with low prestige, such as bar counsel's offices.
Increasing the funding for bar counsel's offices is simply not a viable
plan because bringing even a single case or disciplinary proceeding
against a big-time corporate law firm would be too difficult and
would quickly eat up whatever extra money the state had added to the
bar counsel's budget. It is also true that bar counsel's offices now
have all the work they can handle chasing down lawyers who steal
client funds.
In all my years of research into the law governing lawyers, I have
come across no case in which a state bar authority has successfully
challenged the conduct of a big-time securities or corporate lawyer. I
have not even come across a case in which a state bar authority has
initiated charges against such a lawyer for assisting client fraud or
failing to resign to prevent her services from being used to perpetrate
a fraud. If a lawyer were to be convicted of aiding securities fraud in a
state or federal proceeding, state bar rules would kick in to mete out
automatic penalties for lawyers convicted of crimes involving
dishonesty. That, however, is a big "if," which brings us to other state
regulatory possibilities.

46. See infra note 82 (Congress's change requiring SEC to show knowing participation in
fraud by lawyers).
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Helping a corporate client cheat others or destroy evidence is
criminal activity. As I need not remind members of the Federalist
Society, criminal law is primarily a matter of state law. State
prosecutors do not prosecute lawyers from prestigious firms. Indeed,
it is rare that state authorities prosecute any lawyer for criminal
conduct engaged in as part of "representing" a client. Elsewhere I
have written about the reasons for this lack of prosecutorial zeal, 47 but
due to space limitations here, I will forego that discussion and merely
assert what I know to be true: State prosecutors do not and will not
begin prosecuting corporate lawyers from powerful firms for assisting
client crimes.
This is not a problem peculiar to the states, which brings us to the
first of the two regulatory routes available at the federal level:
prosecution. Historically federal prosecutors have shown no greater
appetite for prosecuting big-firm corporate lawyers than their state
counterparts, and thus far it does not appear that the current wave of
heavily-lawyered corporate scandals has changed anything.
Consider that federal prosecutors acted swiftly to indict David
Duncan, an accountant, for encouraging his team to destroy evidence.
On the other hand, Nancy Temple, the Andersen in-house lawyer
whose lead Duncan says he was following and whose belated
instructions to preserve evidence caused Duncan to stop shredding,
has not been indicted and, as I write this article months after the
Andersen trial, it does not appear that she will be.48 In the National
Student Marketing scandal, accountant Anthony Natelli was convicted
for aiding the fraud.49 Read the description of White & Case attorney
Marion Epley's activities in connection with that fraud laid out by the
47. HAZARD, KONIAK, & CRAMTON, supra note 30, at 59.

48. But see Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Inquiry on Andersen Lawyer is Urged by House
Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002 at C7 (reporting the Committee wants the Justice
Department to consider perjury charges against Temple related to her House testimony); cf
Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyer Caught In Tyco Tangle Leaves Friends Wondering, N.Y. TIMES,
September 24, 2002, at Cl. The conduct that forms the heart of the government's case against
Belnick is self-dealing connected to loans and compensation packages that he and Tyco's CEO
created for Belnick, allegedly as rewards for Belnick helping the CEO defraud the company.
What if Belnick had not engaged, as alleged, in blatant self-dealing, but just helped the CEO or
other managers commit crimes? I have been arguing that that is the more common phenomenon,
and I am highly doubtful that the federal or state authorities would have prosecuted Belnick or
will prosecute any outside or in-house lawyer involved in any of the corporate scandals that
have recently come to light unless that self-dealing component exists. That means lawyers who
commit crimes for payment at their normal hourly rate or normal high in-house counsel salary,
i.e., without themselves directly involving themselves in the funds misappropriated by others
corporate actors, as I am suggesting Temple and many other lawyers have done, will continue to
escape prosecution by federal and state authorities, as they have in the past.
49. SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 687 n.2 (D.D.C. 1978).
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district court in a civil proceeding against other lawyers. 50 Epley was
not prosecuted. Read the description of the conduct of some Jones
Day lawyers (another prestigious law firm) laid out by a district court
in Arizona in denying a summary judgment• 51
motion in a civil suit
brought by private parties against the firm. Relying largely on
evidence from the firm's own files and testimony, the court describes
activities that are not just civil wrongs, but could have been the basis
of criminal charges. None were brought. I could go on, but you get
the point. Federal prosecution of lawyers for crimes has not been used
to rein in lawyers, and there is no reason to believe that that is about
to change.
That brings us to the SEC. Twice upon a time, the SEC got serious
about regulating the bar, first in the early 1970s and once more in the
early 1980s. In the 1970s, it brought an enforcement action in court,
charging lawyers with having aided and abetted the fraud perpetrated
by National Student Marketing Corporation and its merger partner
52
Interstate. The gravaman of the SEC's complaint was that the
lawyers failed to point out clearly and forcefully to company
management and directors that the merger they were about to close
would constitute a fraud because shareholders had been told the
acquiring company had a profit,3 despite management and some
directors knowing that was untrue. The SEC's complaint argued that
the lawyers had to speak out, tell the management and directors
present that closing the deal in these circumstances was illegal, and, if
the actors insisted on going ahead, the lawyers had to inform the
SEC. 54 The lawyers' client was the company, not management or
directors, and when criminal activity was about to jeopardize the
company's future and thus the fortunes of its shareholder-owners,
lawyers had to act to protect the client by telling management and
directors to cease or notify the authorities. To fail in any of this,
according to the SEC, was to aid and abet securities fraud.
The SEC's vision of lawyer responsibility was not made up by the
agency; it precisely echoed what the ethics rules adopted in every
state said at the time. A lawyer who knew a client was engaged in
fraud had to tell the client to stop and rectify, and if the client did not,

50.
51.
52 (D.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
In re Am. Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. and Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1450Ariz. 1992).
See Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 682.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 700-01.
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55

then the lawyer had to inform the defrauded parties. That ethics rule,
against prestigious corporate law
however, had never been enforced
above.
firms, for reasons I explained
What was the bar's reaction to the SEC's action in National
Student Marketing? It declared war. It used all its muscle to beat the
SEC back. It bellowed on about our "King George" government
trying to turn the bar into informants, refusing to concede even a duty
to insist that the law be obeyed within the corporation itself.57 The
ABA amended its "model" ethics rule, upon which the SEC was
relying-the rule that was extant law in every state. That action did
not change the extant law, but it was the start of the ABA's campaign
to purge from state ethics rules the notion that a lawyer must insist
that her client refrain from using her services to commit fraud, rectify
any fraud so perpetrated, and disclose the fraud to those wronged,
unless the client stops and rectifies on its own. The ABA's campaign
still goes on today.
The court in National Student Marketing was keenly aware of the
bar's fury over the SEC's attempt to enforce what was technically the
ethical duty of every lawyer. The court ducked. It held that the
lawyers had aided the fraud by sitting around passively while the
managers and directors engaged in blatant violations of the securities
58
laws that any securities lawyer should have recognized. The court
got fuzzy, however, when it came to explaining precisely what the
lawyers should have done to avoid aiding and abetting the fraud. The
court said "at the least" the lawyers had to speak up, presumably
pointing out to management that proceeding with the deal would be
against the law.59 Would that suffice if the clients' agents persisted?
The court, mentioning the bar's vigorous resistance to the notion that
lawyers should ever disclose fraud to the SEC, refused to say. Much
more troubling, the court, having held the lawyers did aid securities
fraud, refused the SEC's request for an injunction prohibiting the
doing so again. The court said no remedy was
lawyers from
61
warranted. After all, the defendants were lawyers, people who need

55. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 30, at 121, 282-84.
56. The lawyers involved with the merger were from White & Case and Lord, Bissell &
Brook. See Nat'l Sutdent Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 687.
57. See generally HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 30, at 282-88.
58. See Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 712-13.
59. See id. at 713.
60. See id. at 717.
6 1. See id.

No. 11

CorporateFraud:See, Lawyers

no further incentive to follow the law then a gentle reminder by the
court of what the law requires
of them. How naive or disingenuous
62
been?
have
judge
the
could
The SEC, having suffered quite a beating for its efforts in the above
case, retreated from the battlefield for about a decade. Then in the
early 1980s it tried again.. This time
....it attempted to discipline
63 two
lawyers for sitting by passively while a CEO committed fraud. This
time the SEC dropped the "if all fails, tell us" part of its position and
insisted only that a lawyer in these circumstances had to insist that
management abide by the law, had to tell the board of directors if
management was intransigent, and had to resign if the client's agents
(even assuming those agents were the members of the board)
persisted in illegal conduct despite the lawyer's efforts.
The administrative law judge said that the lawyers, who had done
none of those things, warranted discipline by the SEC. Again, the bar
would have none of that. Lo and behold, the SEC reversed the
judge. The SEC said discipline was not justified because securities
lawyers had no fair warning of what conduct would be deemed a
65
disciplinary violation by the SEC, nevermind that the National
Student Marketing court had said such conduct constituted aiding and
abetting securities fraud a decade before. According to the bar and
now the SEC, it was somehow unforeseeable or unclear that aiding
securities fraud warranted disciplinary action by the SEC.
The SEC apparently thought that it could appease the bar by not
disciplining the two lawyers in question and announcing a rule only to
be applied prospectively. After all, that would not only let off the two
lawyers in question, but it would also relieve all the other securities
lawyers who had been busy ignoring the holding in National Student
Marketing. Naive SEC. The SEC put its proposed rule (go up the
corporate ladder
66 to stop fraud and resign, if necessary) out for notice
and comment. After lawyers got finished commenting, the rule was
never heard of again. The SEC abandoned its proposed rule, and with
67
it, its efforts to regulate the bar.
When Enron exploded, forty law professors, myself included,
wrote to Chairman Pitt to urge the SEC to revive its "tell the board
62. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 30 at 117.

63.
64.
65.
66.

See
See
See
See

id. at 739-41.
id. at 740.
id.
Sec. Act Release No. 6344, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 18106 (Sept. 21, 1981).

67. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 30 at 741-42.
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and/or resign" rule that it had abandoned in the 1980s. We received
a response from David Becker, then the SEC's General Counsel,
saying that the SEC had given up trying to regulate lawyers in the
69
early 1980s. Of course it did, that is why we wrote. It said that the
bar was against such a role for the SEC. No kidding. It said that
traditionally bar regulation was a matter left to state authorities and
that is where the matter belonged. As I have explained, leaving it to
at all. 0
state disciplinary authorities means no regulation
Before Congress included language in its corporate reform
legislation demanding the SEC get back in the lawyer-regulation
business,71 Chairman Pitt talked a good deal about accountants, but
was mute on lawyer responsibility for corporate wrongdoing. Indeed,
when Senator John Edwards, following up on the professors' letter to
the SEC, wrote to Chairman Pitt, asking for his help in crafting
legislation to
72 strengthen the SEC's hand against lawyers, he got no
reply at all.
Senator Edwards, joined by Senators Enzi and Corzine, went ahead
without Pitt. They co-sponsored an amendment to the Sarbanes bill,
providing that when lawyers encounter evidence of material
violations of laws relevant to the SEC's jurisdiction in the course of
representing a client, they must report the existence of such evidence
up the corporate ladder to the board of directors, and if necessary
73 T to
get the evidence investigated and any wrongdoing corrected. The
amendment also requires the SEC to issue regulations to implement
the amendment's mandate that the SEC discipline securities lawyers
for helping corporate wrongdoing. This amendment to the Sarbanes
bill passed the Senate 97-0.
The ABA was not pleased. It wrote to the conferees urging them to
omit the Edwards' amendment and to clarify other language in the bill
68. See Letter from Law Professors to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission (March 7, 2002) (on file with author).
69. See Letter from David M. Becker, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Law Professors (March 28, 2002) (on file with author).
70. It should be noted that just as this article was going to print, Harvey Pitt resigned as
Chairman of the SEC.
71. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 7245 (2002).
72. See Letter from Senator John Edwards to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission (June 18, 2002) (on file with author). Becker's reply to the Professors'
letter suggested that the SEC would not move again to use its existing power to discipline
lawyers under Rule 102(e) without instructions from Congress. It is to that portion of Becker's
reply that Senator Edwards referred to in asking Chairman Pitt to help him craft legislation to
bolster the SEC's regulatory authority over lawyers.
73. See 148 CONG. REC. S6580 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (amendment of Sen. Edwards to SA
4187).
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that might suggest that the federal government,
through any of its
74
arms, should be regulating securities lawyers. The ABA trotted out
all its standard arguments with particular
emphasis on the lawyer75
discipline-is-for-the-states refrain. That argument ignores the fact
that patent lawyers, bankruptcy lawyers, and tax lawyers all are
regulated at the federal level, given their practices in areas of federal
concern. Indeed, securities lawyers are the odd group out. They
practice in an area of unquestioned federal supremacy, yet are not
subject to a meaningful federal
regulatory
regime (or, as I am arguing,
•
.
76
any other form of meaningful regulation).
The conferees resisted the ABA's lobbying and left in the Edwards
amendment. The President signed the law. Now, we wait to see
whether the reluctant SEC takes up this Congressional mandate with
energy and purpose. I wish I could tell you I am hopeful. I am not.
The final avenue of ineffective lawyer regulation is private
litigation. In 1994, the Supreme Court suddenly announced that
private causes of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud were
77
not authorized by law. For decades, courts had held that the
securities laws included an "implied" cause of action for aiding and
abetting securities fraud. The current Court, not inclined to "imply"
causes of action when the relevant statute does not explicitly create
them, was not persuaded by Congress's longstanding, if tacit,
acquiescence to the "implied" cause of action theory, and thus put an
end to private suits against lawyers (and others) for aiding securities
fraud. The following year, Congress undertook a substantial revision
of the securities laws and had every opportunity to write in explicit
language authorizing private aiding and abetting suits, thereby
restoring the legal landscape that the Supreme Court had disturbed.

74. See Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs Office, American Bar
Association
to Senator
Paul S.
Sarbanes (July
19, 2002) available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107th/business071902.html.
75. See id.
76. That is not to say that the lawyers practicing in other federal areas are adequately
regulated. At least as to bankruptcy lawyers I am convinced they are not. Rather, it is to say that
the fight for exclusive state regulation of those lawyers has been over for a long, long time.
77. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1994).
This case states that,
As in earlier cases considering conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we again conclude that
the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the
commission of a manipulative act (citations omitted). The proscription does not
include giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act. We
cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves
manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the statute.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Congress, however, chose not to do so.
Securities fraud is not just an intentional tort; it is also a serious
crime. The idea that criminal aiding and abetting is not an actionable
civil wrong from which individuals damaged by the fraud can seek
redress from our courts is, in my opinion, an outrage. The justification
given for this outrage is that class action plaintiffs' lawyers will abuse
the system by filing frivolous suits. I am no fan of the class action
plaintiffs' bar. Indeed, for almost ten years now I have been writing
article after article on the urgent
78 need to establish meaningful
regulation of class action lawyers. But the idea that an unscrupulous
plaintiffs' class action bar justifies denying redress in the courts to
persons wronged by those who aid and abet fraud is unjust and
dangerous. The injustice is plain, for this punishes defrauded persons
for the actions of lawyers who they may never have met, no less
retained. As to the danger, it removes an otherwise powerful method
of deterring future misconduct on the part of corporate counsel-a
group that is otherwise virtually impervious to penalties for the
damage they cause. The answer to class action abuse is not to
foreclose meritorious actions for aiding and abetting against lawyers
or others, thereby further wronging institutional and individual
investors who have already been wronged. It is class action lawyers
who abuse the system that should be punished, not their clients.
The elimination of private suits for aiding and abetting dismantled
one of the only working methods of regulating corporate lawyers and
deterring bad conduct by members of this elite and powerful section
of the bar. Lawyers can still be sued as primary violators of the
78. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without
Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 (2001) (discussing the relative strength of the ethics
rules that speak to corporate lawyers as compared to those that speak to the conduct of class
counsel); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051 (1996) (arguing that class action lawyers be liable for malpractice, fraud and antitrust
violations committed in the course of bringing or settling class suits and discussing examples of
class action settlements in which conduct allegedly engaged in by class and defense counsel
constituted a civil wrong or a criminal act under state or federal law, and arguing that the
findings made by state and federal courts in blessing these settlements should not immunize the
conduct from the reach of state tort law, consumer protection law, criminal law, or antitrust
suits); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (describing the numerous ethical and legal failings of class
counsel in this suit, which reached the Supreme Court as Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591(1997)). 1 also testified before the House Judiciary Committee on the abuse of class action
lawyers. See Hearings on Class Action Abuse before the Courts and Intellectual Property

Subcomm. of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 10 5 th Cong. (1998).
Previously, I aided then Senator Cohen, from Maine, in drafting legislation to curb some abuses
by class action lawyers-legislation still not passed but, which is introduced each year, by
Senators Kohl and Grassley. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong.
(2001).
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securities laws, but that case is very difficult to make. In plain
language, what lawyers can do wrong is help others break the law. In
law that is called "aiding and abetting." To force plaintiffs to sue
under some strained and not precisely applicable theory (i.e., that
lawyers are primary violators of the law) seriously weakens their
chances of success, thereby making the settlement value of such suits
quite low. This, in turn, virtually wipes out the power of the law to
deter the "helping" conduct that I have been arguing is so central to
the success of corporate fraud. Proving that the lawyers were so
central to the fraud that they qualify as primary actors is possible, but
very difficult. The deterrent value of the law has thus been
undermined. The law Congress passed in 1995, however, does not
stop there. It further undermines the deterrent value of suits against
lawyers by eliminating joint and several liability for all (including law
firms) and establishing tough new pleading requirements for
plaintiffs.79
Most cases settle, but suits against law firms settle at an even
higher rate. Lawyers do not want to risk court decisions that articulate
precisely what they have done wrong and what they better not do
again. Settlements avoid that risk. Cheap settlements allow lawyers to
avoid that risk and keep the lion's share of the oversized fees big-time
lawyers charge for "lawyering" fraudulent transactions. In short, the
so-called "reform act" gave a license to go all out to a profession that
was already prone to turn a blind-eye to evidence of fraud and to offer
a helping hand to their clients' schemes. The result is that we are now
so knee-deep in corporate corruption in institutions so central to our
nation's economy, such as Citigroup and J.P. Morgan, that I am
uncertain whether we can actually afford to punish the wrongs that
seem to have been perpetrated on so many or to examine just how
perverse the regular business practices of our financial institutions
have become.
We need to look back for a moment to the SEC. I described two
instances of the SEC attempting to get tough with the bar. Something
I did not state explicitly above is that the SEC employed two different
methods. In the 1970s case, the SEC brought an enforcement action
against lawyers in court, alleging the lawyers had aided and abetted.
In the 1980s, the SEC used its rarely used power to discipline lawyers
who practice before it. The Edwards amendment seeks to bolster the

79. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
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latter method. What of the SEC's other route, enforcement actions
against lawyers brought in court alleging aiding and abetting
securities law violations?
When the Supreme Court eliminated private causes of action for
aiding and abetting, it did not specifically address whether the SEC
could still bring such suits. The reasoning of the opinion, however,
seemed to apply to any action for aiding and abetting, whether
brought by a private person or the SEC. Congress clarified that. In the
1995 Securities Reform Act, it specifically affirmed the SEC's power
80
to bring aiding and abetting actions. So far, so good. But what
Congress gave with one hand, it took away with the other. It
legislated that, from then on, the SEC would have to show that the
assistance was "knowing" and not just "reckless.", 8 1 Recklessly
assisting fraud had defined aiding and abetting liability for decades.
Congress got rid of all that old law. As I explained above, showing
that a lawyer "knew" something was illegal is a very difficult task.
This reining in of the SEC would have been comical if it were not
so indicative of the government's cowardice in the face of the bar.
The SEC was dormant, already a paper tiger. It gave-up on aiding and
abetting suits against lawyers a long time ago. The SEC needed no
new excuses to leave lawyers alone. Nonetheless the bar persuaded
Congress to provide one.
One last avenue is left to explore-suits brought by the clients
themselves for malpractice committed by attorneys that carelessly
allow corporate managers to commit crimes. These are relatively easy
cases to bring, and deterring negligence (carelessness) by lawyers in
the face of corporate fraud would, by definition, take care of all the
reckless lawyer conduct as well. All of that assumes, however, that
the corporate client's senior management team and its board would be
willing to sue the lawyers who helped management break the law.
They are not. The lawyers know all about those agents' many hidden
skeletons. After the savings and loan debacle, commercial institutions
sued the lawyers who had not objected when senior management
looted those banks. The suits happened only because the banks'
federally appointed receivers had no personal interest in covering up
the misdeeds of former management. In contrast, Enron has not sued
its lawyers; there are still too many old hands running the show. The
same goes for Global Crossing and Andersen.
80. See id. at § 104.
81. See id.
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As I have described above, there is no state regulation, no federal
regulation, and no major threat from private suits. That is a law-free
zone, and it has to end. The Edwards amendment to the Sarbanes bill
is a step in the right direction, but it will not work without a
commitment of will by the SEC. That commitment of will will not
occur unless responsible business leaders, Republican politicians,
institutional investors, and the press insist that. Will that happen?
Nothing thus far suggests it will. The silence on lawyer involvement
is still breathtaking.
Even if it does happen, and with increased funding, the SEC simply
has too much to do to be the sole method of regulating the securities
bar. Private causes of action for aiding and abetting, joint and several
liability, and the recklessness standard must all be restored, at least
for lawyers. Senator Shelby had an amendment that did the first and
last of those three, an excellent beginning. 82 It went nowhere fast. In
sum, as things now stand, the law-free zone for lawyers is as large
and impenetrable as ever.
IV. LIES OR CONSEQUENCES

Norms maintained by private means (morality, ethics, religious
principles) do not exist in a vacuum. They coexist, affect, and are
affected by the norms of law. The difference between privately
maintained norms and publicly maintained norms (what most people
call law) is not the conduct that they address. There is at least as much
conduct addressed by both normative systems (private and public) as
there is conduct addressed by only one. Indeed, the area of overlap is
probably a lot greater than the area in which only one system
operates. The greatest difference between the two normative systems
is in the manner in which commitment to the norms is expressed.
Private groups express commitment to their norms by ostracizing
those who defy important norms, shaming them, denying them
community prestige, and other signs of approval that the community
has the power to bestow-positions of influence, monetary rewards,
and similar signs of honor and acceptance.
The State, on the other hand, expresses its commitment to its norms
by employing its important, albeit imperfect, monopoly on the use of

82. See 148 CONG. REC. S6584 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (amendment of Sen. Shelby to SA
4197).
83. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1409-27 (1992) (discussing the hierarchy of norms).
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force. All law is the exercise of State force, even civil sanctions,
which are backed by the power of the State to seize one who defies
those sanctions and throw her in jail. So, civil sanctions are properly
read this way: pay these damages or lose your liberty; follow this
injunction or lose your liberty; disgorge ill-gotten gains or lose your
liberty. You get the point.
Any norm, public or private, which exists without commitment, is
all but useless as a means of guiding conduct. A norm that no one
intends be realized today in action is something less than a norm,
something less than law. The State's norms on lawyer behavior are
something less than law. The private norms that take their place, the
bar's norms, diverge from the impotent State norms and indeed
dictate conduct that the State's laws ostensibly forbid or would forbid,
if anyone was prepared to insist that the laws be followed.
The bar's norms are evident from the status of the lawyers and
firms that aid corporate wrongdoing and just how many lawyers and
law firms are involved. The law firms involved in aiding major
corporate fraud are not outlier firms, renegades practicing some
perversion of what the pillars of the bar would tolerate; they are the
pillars of the bar-the community's elders and norm generators. They
are not concentrated in one area of the country; the norms they live by
are nationwide. A lawyer who does not have it in her to follow these
norms, who is not tough enough to stretch every law until its form and
purpose are destroyed, will not make it to the top. It is just that
simple. The bar's private norms are that strong.
This is so because the State's norms, which reflect not just the bar's
narrow perspective and self-interest, but the interests of the larger
community (most notably the investing public and institutions) have
lost any claim to the name of law through a failure of State
enforcement (commitment to state law). The bar is not challenged to
rethink its norms since it incurs no costs or consequences for ignoring
state law. But the lawyer who ignores bar norms, who refuses to assist
a client's fraud and lies, that lawyer is likely to pay a price. When
every lawyer knows that refusing to help a client break the law is a
futile gesture because the lawyer down the street will be happy to take
the fees you lose by your desire to follow state law that not even the
State takes seriously, what result would one expect to see? Plenty of
lawyers are willing to assist client fraud and to relieve their clients
from the constraints of law. It is the rest of us who bear the
consequences.
The State needs to take its norms seriously or no one else will.
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CONCLUSION

I began by asserting that lawyers were central to corporate
wrongdoing. Few, if any, corporate frauds could exist without
lawyers; and fewer still could be maintained long enough to do any
substantial harm. The examples I provided of lawyer involvement in
the current wave of corporate scandals were used to demonstrate that
point, but let me be more direct. No major corporate transaction goes
forward without a lawyer's okay; no securities documents get filed
without a lawyer's review; and no private placement memoranda are
issued without a lawyer's input, if not a lawyer's drafting them
herself.
We had laws on the books that prohibited most and maybe all of
the damaging conduct engaged in by companies like Enron. But it
takes lawyers to bring that law to bear on transactions and corporate
activities, as they are being planned and implemented. When lawyers
use their skills instead to circumvent those laws, we end up here.
Unless we rein in the lawyers, what use is it to write new laws or to
enact reforms? As long as lawyers stand ready to interpret our laws
out of existence to serve management's goals, our new laws will be as
ineffective as our old ones. Take away the lawyer's law-free zone and
the law-free zones lawyers build for others will shrink too.
The law, lawyers used to say, is a jealous mistress. No mistress,
jealous or not, would tolerate the total disregard that pillars of the bar
now demonstrate toward the law. We are supposed to be the law's
servants. It is not supposed to be the other way around. When we treat
law this way, we dishonor ourselves. When the law gives lawyers
license to ignore its dictates, it sows the seeds of its own destruction.
This is your wake up call.
POSTSCRIPT: JANUARY 26, 2003
As this article was going to print, the SEC, as mandated by the
Edwards amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, adopted an
up-the-ladder reporting rule for lawyers. The final text of the rule
was not available at the time this postscript was due. Nonetheless, a
few preliminary observations are possible.
The rule originally proposed by the SEC in November of 2002
provided that a lawyer would have to withdraw, disaffirm any
84. Press Release 2003-13, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Attorney
Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (January 23, 2003) (available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm).

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 26

fraudulent or misleading documents she had filed with the SEC and
inform the SEC of the fact of withdrawal, if the board of directors of a
company refused to take appropriate action to investigate evidence of
fraud brought to its attention by the lawyer or failed to rectify
company fraud to which the lawyer had alerted it. This was known as
the "noisy withdrawal" provision of the proposed rule, and it received
the most press attention with lawyers and the organized bar
was inconsistent with
complaining loud and hard that this provision 85
the professional responsibilities of lawyers. The SEC punted,
deferring further consideration of this controversial provision to allow
more time for comment. In the meantime, the SEC proposed an
alternative to the noisy withdrawal provision that would shift the
responsibility for reporting the fact that a lawyer had withdrawn
because of an inadequate response to an up-the-ladder report (required
by the rule as adopted) to the company, relieving the lawyer from the
"noise" part of the "withdrawal" requirement.
Investors will be as protected by a company's reporting that its
lawyer had to withdraw after an unacceptable company response to an
up-the-ladder report of wrongdoing as they would be by the lawyer
herself making such a report to the SEC. I thus am not troubled by the
alternative to lawyer-noisy-withdrawal proposed by the SEC. But that
does not mean all is well.
The entire noisy withdrawal controversy was overblown by the
media and the bar, and unfortunately that masked the much more
important battleground: What should trigger a lawyer's duty to report
evidence of fraud to a company's CEO or Chief Legal Officer (CLO)
and when should a lawyer have a further duty to report that evidence
up-the-ladder to a company's board or a committee of the board?
Whether anything changes about lawyer behavior in the face of
evidence of corporate fraud depends on how that trigger is defined, or
more appropriately how "those triggers" are defined in that there are
at least two steps here: an obligation to report to the CEO or CLO and
an obligation to report to the full board or a board committee, and
maybe a third: the obligation of company (or lawyer) to report to the
SEC an inadequate company response to a report to the board.
Along with Professors George Cohen and Roger Cramton, I wrote
extensive comments to the SEC on its original propoal, comments
that were endorsed by some 50 other securities and law governing
85. The SEC was inundated by comments from lawyers and bar groups. Those comments
were posted by the SEC at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml.
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lawyers' professors. Our comments endorsed the original noisy
withdrawal proposal, pointing out that noisy withdrawal was allowed
by the ethics rules of almost every state and already required in
certain instances by the newest Comments to the ABA's Model
Rules. Thus, to describe the SEC's proposal as groundbreaking,
outrageous, or destructive of the attorney-client relationship as
currently understood was the worst form of hyperbole and just plain
false, particularly given that any company could completely avoid
their lawyers' having to make noisy withdrawal, under the SEC's
proposal, by creating a qualified legal compliance committee. More
important, our comments emphasized that the most important issue
were the triggers for lawyer reporting within the company, not noisy
withdrawal. After all, had the SEC adopted its own noisy withdrawal
proposal, it's operation would depend on when the first and second
reports (to the CEO/CLO and the board) would be required. We thus
concentrated our comments on the all-important triggers.
Our position was that the SEC's proposed triggers were a mess: too
high to accomplish the kind of reporting intended by the Edwards
amendment and, as troubling, confused and confusing. The bar, for its
part, carried on publicly about noisy withdrawal but spent at least as
much time as we did in the many comments submitted by groups of
law firms, official bar groups, bar insurers and individual lawyers,
arguing that the triggers proposed by the SEC should be made even
higher. Many of the comments submitted by the bar argued that
lawyers should only have to report evidence of fraud to CEOs or
boards of directors that was strong enough to allow a lawyer to
"know" that fraud was in fact occurring. As I discussed earlier in that
article, that standard, integral to the structure of bar-written ethics
rules, is useless and would only perpetuate the unredeemed status
quo.
In contrast, the professors proposed that first level reporting (to the
CEO or CLO) occur when a reasonable and prudent lawyer would
conclude that credible evidence available to her constituted probable
cause to believe a material violation of law had, was or would occur.
If, after that report and any response from the company's
management, the lawyer learned nothing to alter that judgment, she
would be required to report to the board. As for making noisy
withdrawal to the SEC, we proposed a higher standard, adding that
the evidence be both credible and substantial and that it be evidence
86. Id. Those comments are on file with the author and were posted on the SEC's website.
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of a violation of law that was likely to cause substantial financial
injury to investors or the company.
The SEC's final rules, as I said, are not yet published, but its press
release states that it has revised its triggering standard:
The revised definition confirms that the Commission intends an
objective, rather than a subjective, triggering standard, involving
credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable,
under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not
to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur.
There's a reason double negatives are considered poor grammar.
They require the mind to do flips to understand what is being said.
The press was quick to lambaste the SEC for its workmanship:
A lawyer who reasonably believes his client is a crook can keep
quiet [under the new definition], so long as it would not be
unreasonable for someone else to fail to conclude he was right.
Using the double negive made it a lot harder for the SEC to
prove a violation later.
I listened to the SEC's live webcast of the meeting at which it
adopted its rule. I was disturbed not just by the convoluted triggering
definition but other statements made by the staff and the
Commissioner about the new rule that the agency was adoptingstatements that suggested that the rule may have been narrowed in its
scope in various ways that would weaken its effectiveness. Time will
tell.
For now, I am prepared to say this. The SEC's tortured triggering
standard and its refusal to mandate without further delay that a
company, as opposed to its lawyer, notify the agency when its lawyer
is forced to withdraw over potential company fraud say something
important about the power of the bar to fend off reform.
Unfortunately for the American public, and to the everlasting disgrace
of the bar, the freedom to remain complacent in the face of client
fraud appears to be one of the bar's most cherished prerogatives. It is
not apparent that the SEC has the strength or will to insist that that
change.
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